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a b s t r a c t
In this paper, we show how one of the Kyoto Protocol mechanisms, the so-called joint
implementation in environmental projects, can be transformed into and studied as an
infinite-dimensional quasi-variational inequality. Specifically, we examine the situation in
which different countries attempt to fulfill Kyoto commitments by investing in emission
reduction or emission removal projects in countries where the abatement costs are
lower. We derive the equilibrium conditions and prove their characterization in terms
of an infinite-dimensional quasi-variational inequality problem. Finally, we discuss the
existence of solutions.
© 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. The model
The 1997 Kyoto Protocol prescribes that some industrialized countries, labeled as ‘‘Annex I Parties’’, must reduce their
greenhouse gas emissions to at least 5% below the 1990 levels for the 2008–2012 period (see [1]). Under the Treaty, countries
must meet their targets primarily through national measures; however, some other market-based mechanisms are offered.
In this paper, we focus on the so-called joint implementation (JI), a mechanism that allows Parties, with emission reduction
or limitation commitments, to collect rewards in the form of emission reduction units (ERUs) from an emission reduction
or emission removal project in another Annex I Party, where the abatement costs are lower.
In this paper, we present a new approach in the study of the JI mechanism, based on variational inequality theory. It
is by now recognized how variational inequality theory can be fruitfully applied to describe a large variety of equilibrium
problems, such as the traffic equilibrium problem, the spatial price equilibrium problem, the financial equilibrium problem,
theWalras equilibriumproblem,migration networks, and electric power supply chain networks (see for instance [2–6]). Our
aim is to show how the JI mechanism can be transformed into and studied as a quasi-variational inequality. We emphasize
that a quasi-variational inequality framework is applied to such a model for the first time. It is out of the scope of the
present paper to discuss theoretical and computational advances on quasi-variational inequalities; however, we address
the interested reader to the books [7,8] and, amongst others, to the paper [9].
In addition, we explicitly take into account the evolution of the system with respect to time, and hence assume that all
data are time dependent, and study the evolution of the system during the time horizon [0, t], with t > 0. The importance
of studying evolutionary problems, in order to represent models that are able to involve equilibria adjustment processes or
retarded equilibria (see for instance [10–14]), is indeed well known.
Following [15–17],we nowpresent the features of themodel. LetN be the number of countries involved in the programof
control pollution. Let ei(t) denote the gross emissions resulting from the industrial production of country i at time t ∈ [0, t],
which are proportional to the industrial output of the country. Let the revenue Ri of country i be defined as the function
Ri(t, ei(t)) : [0, t] × R+ → R+.
Emissions can be reduced by investing in local or foreign projects. Let I ij (t) be the amount of environmental investments
held by country i in country j at time t ∈ [0, t]. Further, we group the total emissions and the investments held by
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country i in the column vectors e(t) = (e1(t), . . . , eN(t))T and I i(t) = (I i1(t), . . . , I iN(t))T , respectively. The benefits
of investments lie in the acquisition of emission reduction units (ERUs), which are assumed to be proportional to the
investment, namely have the form γij(t)I ij (t). Here, γij(t) is a positive technological efficiency parameter depending on
both the investor i and the host country j, because in general there is a dependence on both the investor’s technologies
and laws, and the situation in the host country. In addition, we assume that γji(t) and 1γij(t) , for j = 1, . . . ,N , belong to
L∞([0, t]). We denote by I−i(t) the N(N − 1)-vector of all the investments held by all the countries except i. Analogously,
e−i(t) represents the (N − 1)-vector of the gross emissions of countries different from i. We further group the total amount
of investments into the N2-vector I(t) = (I i(t), I−i(t)), and denote by e(t) = (ei(t), e−i(t)) the total gross emissions.
In order to shorten the notation, sometimes we will omit the dependence on t . The net emission in country i, namely,
the difference between the gross emissions and the reduction resulting from local and foreign investments in the same
country, is denoted by ηi(t, ei, I1i , . . . , I
N
i ) = ei(t)− γii(t)I ii (t)−
∑N
j=1
j≠i
γji(t)I
j
i (t) ≥ 0 a.e. in [0, t]. Moreover, the accounted-
for emissions of country i, given by its own emissions minus the ERUs gained by investing in environmental projects,
must be kept below a prescribed level Ei(t) > 0 a.e. in [0, t]; namely, the following environmental constraint holds:
εi(t, ei, I i) = ei(t)− γii(t)I ii (t)−
∑N
j=1
j≠i
γij(t)I ij (t) ≤ Ei(t) a.e. in [0, t]. Let the local investment cost be given by
Ci(t, I i) : [0, t] × RN+ → R+.
We also assume that pollution in one country can affect also other countries; hence, the damage from pollution in one
country depends on the net emissions of all countries according to the function Di(t, e, I) : [0, t] × RN+N2+ → R+, where
Di(t, e, I) = Di

t, η1(t, e1, I11 , . . . , I
N
1 ), . . . , ηN(t, e
N , I1N , . . . , I
N
N )

.
We choose as our functional settings the Hilbert spaces L2([0, t],R1+N) of square-integrable functions defined in the
closed interval [0, t], endowed with the scalar product ⟨·, ·⟩L2 =
 t
0 ⟨·, ·⟩dt and the usual associated norm ‖ · ‖L2 .
We assume that, for all i, Ri(t, ei), Ci(t, I i), and Di(t, e, I) are measurable in t and continuous with respect to the other
arguments. Moreover, we assume that ∂Ri(t,e
i)
∂ei
, ∂Di(t,e,I)
∂ei
, ∂Ci(t,I
i)
∂ I ij
, and ∂Di(t,e,I)
∂ I ij
, j = 1, . . . ,N , exist and are measurable in t and
continuous with respect to the other arguments. In addition, we require the following growth conditions in order to ensure
that the above functions are square-integrable.
∃δi1, δi2 ∈ L2([0, t]) :
∂Ri(t, ei)∂ei
 ≤ δi1(t)+ |ei|,
∂Ci(t, I i)∂ I ij
 ≤ δi2(t)+ |I i|, (1)
∃δi3, δi4 ∈ L2([0, t]) :
∂Di(t, e, I)∂ei
 ≤ δi3(t)+ |e|,
∂Di(t, e, I)∂ I ij
 ≤ δi4(t)+ |I|. (2)
The goal of country i, given the other players’ strategies (e∗−i, I∗−i), consists in choosing the strategy (ei, I i) that
maximizes the revenue and minimizes the investments in emission reduction as well as the damage from pollution.
Therefore, each country has to solve the following optimization problem:
max
(ei,I i)∈Ki(e∗−i,I∗−i)
∫ t
0
Wi(t, ei(t), I i(t), e∗−i(t), I∗−i(t))dt, (3)
where
Wi(t, ei(t), I i(t), e∗−i(t), I∗−i(t)) = Ri(t, ei(t))− Ci(t, I i(t))− Di(t, e(t), I(t))
and
Ki(e∗−i, I∗−i) =
(ei, I i) ∈ L2([0, t],R1+N) : ei(t) ≥ 0, I ij (t) ≥ 0, j = 1, . . . ,N,
ei(t)− γii(t)I ii (t)−
N−
j=1
j≠i
γij(t)I ij (t) ≤ Ei(t), (4)
ei(t)− γii(t)I ii (t)−
N−
j=1
j≠i
γji(t)I
∗j
i (t) ≥ 0, (5)
e∗k(t)− γik(t)I ik(t)−
N−
j=1
j≠i
γjk(t)I
∗j
k (t) ≥ 0, k = 1, . . . ,N, k ≠ i, a.e. in [0, t]
 . (6)
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Let us set K(e∗, I∗) =∏Ni=1 Ki(e∗−i, I∗−i).
Definition 1. A vector of emissions and investments (e∗(t), I∗(t)) ∈ K(e∗, I∗) is an equilibrium of the evolutionary
environmental pollution control problem if and only if, for each i = 1, . . . ,N , and a.e. in [0, t], it satisfies the conditions
−∂Ri(t, e
∗i)
∂ei
+ ∂Di(t, e
∗, I∗)
∂ei
+ νi(t)− τi(t) ≥ 0, (7)
∂Ci(t, I∗i)
∂ I ii
+ ∂Di(t, e
∗, I∗)
∂ I ii
− νi(t)γii(t)+ τi(t)γii(t) ≥ 0, (8)
∂Ci(t, I∗i)
∂ I ij
+ ∂Di(t, e
∗, I∗)
∂ I ij
− νi(t)γij(t) ≥ 0, j ≠ i, (9)
−∂Ri(t, e
∗i)
∂ei
+ ∂Di(t, e
∗, I∗)
∂ei
+ νi(t)− τi(t)

e∗i(t) = 0, (10)
∂Ci(t, I∗i)
∂ I ii
+ ∂Di(t, e
∗, I∗)
∂ I ii
− νi(t)γii(t)+ τi(t)γii(t)

I∗ii (t) = 0, (11)
∂Ci(t, I∗i)
∂ I ij
+ ∂Di(t, e
∗, I∗)
∂ I ij
− νi(t)γij(t)

I∗ij (t) = 0, j ≠ i. (12)
simultaneously, where νi(t), τi(t) ∈ L2([0, t])+ are the Lagrange multipliers attached to the environmental constraint and
the non-negativity constraint of net emissions, respectively.
2. Quasi-variational inequality formulation
In this section, we provide the quasi-variational inequality formulation of our problem.
Theorem 1. A vector of emissions and investments (e∗, I∗) is an equilibrium of the evolutionary environmental pollution control
problem if and only if it satisfies the following quasi-variational inequality:
N−
i=1
∫ t
0

−∂Ri(t, e
∗i)
∂ei
+ ∂Di(t, e
∗, I∗)
∂ei
+ νi(t)− τi(t)

(ei(t)− e∗i(t))
+

∂Ci(t, I∗i)
∂ I ii
+ ∂Di(t, e
∗, I∗)
∂ I ii
− νi(t)γii(t)+ τi(t)γii(t)

(I ii (t)− I∗ii (t))
+
N−
j=1

∂Ci(t, I∗i)
∂ I ij
+ ∂Di(t, e
∗, I∗)
∂ I ij
− νi(t)γij(t)

(I ij (t)− I∗ij (t))

dt ≥ 0, ∀(e, I) ∈ K(e∗, I∗). (13)
Proof. Let (e∗(t), I∗(t)) ∈ K(e∗, I∗) be an equilibrium solution. Therefore, a.e. in [0, t], and for all i = 1, . . . ,N , we may
write 
−∂Ri(t, e
∗i)
∂ei
+ ∂Di(t, e
∗, I∗)
∂ei
+ νi(t)− τi(t)

(ei(t)− e∗i(t)) ≥ 0,
∂Ci(t, I∗i)
∂ I ii
+ ∂Di(t, e
∗, I∗)
∂ I ii
− νi(t)γii(t)+ τi(t)γii(t)

(I ii (t)− I∗ii (t)) ≥ 0,
N−
j=1

∂Ci(t, I∗i)
∂ I ij
+ ∂Di(t, e
∗, I∗)
∂ I ij
− νi(t)γij(t)

(I ij (t)− I∗ij (t)) ≥ 0.
Summing up the above inequalities and integrating, we immediately find (13).
We now establish that, if (e∗(t), I∗(t)) ∈ K(e∗, I∗) satisfies quasi-variational inequality (13), it also verifies equilibrium
conditions (7)–(12). By contradiction, we assume that the equilibrium conditions are not verified.Without loss of generality,
we can suppose that conditions (7) and (10) are not satisfied. Hence, there exist an index s ∈ {1, . . . ,N} and a set E ⊂ [0, t]
with positive measure, such that
− ∂Rs(t, e
∗s)
∂es
+ ∂Ds(t, e
∗, I∗)
∂es
+ νs(t)− τs(t) < 0, a.e. on E. (14)
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Let us choose I ij (t) = I∗ij (t), for i, j = 1, . . . ,N , a.e. in [0, t], ei(t) = e∗i(t), for i ≠ s in [0, t], and
es(t)
= e∗s(t) if t ∈ [0, t] \ E,
> e∗s(t) if t ∈ E.
By virtue of the choices of e(t) and I(t), and due to condition (14), quasi-variational inequality (13) reduces to∫
E

−∂Rs(t, e
∗s)
∂es
+ ∂Ds(t, e
∗, I∗)
∂es
+ νs(t)− τs(t)

(es(t)− e∗s(t))dt < 0,
which is an absurd assertion. 
Remark 1. It is worth noting that the existence of Lagrange multipliers νi(t), τi(t) can be ensured by exploiting recent
results in [18–25] that use a generalized constraint qualification assumption, referred as Assumption S, based on the notion
of quasi-relative interior.
3. An existence result
Before showing our result, we recall the following theorem adapted to our case (see [26]), which will be useful for our
purposes. We also address the interested reader to [7] for general existence results.
Theorem 2. Let Y be a topological linear locally convex Hausdorff space, and let E ⊂ Y be a convex, compact, and nonempty
subset. Let F : E → Y ′ be a continuous function, and let K : E → 2E be a closed lower semi-continuous set-valued map with
K(X), X ∈ E, convex, compact, and nonempty. Then, there exists X∗ ∈ K(X∗) such that
⟨F(X∗), X − X∗⟩ ≥ 0, ∀X ∈ K(X∗).
In order to simplify notation, for i = 1, . . . ,N , we set
Fi(t, ei, I i) =

−∂Ri(t, e
∗i)
∂ei
+ ∂Di(t, e
∗, I∗)
∂ei
+ νi(t)− τi(t)
∂Ci(t, I∗i)
∂ I ii
+ ∂Di(t, e
∗, I∗)
∂ I ii
− νi(t)γii(t)+ τi(t)γii(t)
N−
j=1

∂Ci(t, I∗i)
∂ I ij
+ ∂Di(t, e
∗, I∗)
∂ I ij
− νi(t)γij(t)

 .
Now, we are able to prove our outcome. We note that the theorem has recourse to weak topology arguments (see, for
example, [27] for definitions and properties). The advantage of such a framework is that the (weak) compactness of the set
Ki(e∗−i, I∗−i) can be deduced without requiring any compactness on set E; see also [6,28].
Theorem 3. Let us assume that, for all i = 1, . . . ,N, the function
Fi : [0, t] × R1+N → R1+N
satisfies the following conditions.
(a) Fi(t, ei, I i) is measurable in t∀ei, I i, and continuous with respect to ei, I i a.e. in [0, t]. Moreover, let us suppose that
∂Ri(t,ei)
∂ei
,
∂Di(t,e,I)
∂ei
,
∂Ci(t,I i)
∂ I ij
and ∂Di(t,e,I)
∂ I ij
, j = 1, . . . ,N are measurable in t and continuous with respect to the other arguments,
and that the growth conditions (1) and (2) are verified.
(b) Fi(t, ei, I i) is convex in ei, I i a.e. in [0, t], and upper semi-continuous with respect to the weak topology in ei, I i a.e. in [0, t].
(c) γji(t) and 1γij(t) , for j = 1, . . . ,N, belong to L∞([0, t]).
Then, quasi-variational inequality problem (13) admits solutions.
Proof. First, we fix i ∈ {1, . . . ,N} and reduce the quasi-equilibrium constraints (5) and (6) to equality constraints, by
introducing the slack variables sij(t) ≥ 0, j = 1, . . . ,N (we also set si(t) = (si1(t), . . . , siN(t))T ). Thus, we may write
ei(t)− γii(t)I ii (t)−
N−
j=1
j≠i
γji(t)I
∗j
i (t)− sii(t) = 0, (15)
e∗k(t)− γik(t)I ik(t)−
N−
j=1
j≠i
γjk(t)I
∗j
k (t)− sik(t) = 0, (16)
k = 1, . . . ,N, k ≠ i, a.e. in [0, t].
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We proceed using arguments of weak topology. Under hypothesis (a), and if (e∗i, I∗i) ∈ L2([0, t],R1+N), it results that
Fi(t, e∗i, I∗i) ∈ L2([0, t],R1+N). Moreover, Fi(t, e∗i, I∗i) belongs to the class of Nemytskii operators (see Example 2.5.5, p. 159,
and Example 4.7.3, p. 341, in [29] for definitions andmain properties of Nemytskii operators); therefore, if {(e∗in , I∗in )} strongly
converges to (e∗i, I∗i) in L2, then
‖Fi(t, e∗in , I∗in )− Fi(t, e∗i, I∗i)‖L2 → 0,
and the function Fi is continuous in L2 with respect to the strong topology.
Now, in order to prove that Ki(e∗−i, I∗−i) is a weakly closed set-valued map, we show that it is strongly closed, i.e.,
∀{(e∗in , I∗in , s∗in )} → (e∗i, I∗i, s∗i), ∀{(ein, I in, sin)} → (ei, I i, si),
with (ein, I
i
n, s
i
n) ∈ Ki(e∗−in , I∗−in )∀n ∈ N, (ei, I i, si) ∈ Ki(e∗−i, I∗−i).
Let {(e∗in , I∗in , s∗in )} and {(ein, I in, sin)} be two arbitrary sequences strongly converging to (e∗i, I∗i, s∗i) and (ei, I i, si),
respectively. Since (ein, I
i
n, s
i
n) ∈ Ki(e∗−in , I∗−in ), we have, for n ∈ N, and a.e. in [0, t],
(c1) ein(t), I
i
j,n(t), s
i
j,n(t) ≥ 0, ∀j = 1, . . . ,N ,
(c2) ein(t)− γii(t)I ii,n(t)−
∑N
j=1
j≠i
γij(t)I ij,n(t) ≤ Ei(t),
(c3) ein(t)− γii(t)I ii,n(t)−
∑N
j=1
j≠i
γji(t)I
∗j
i,n(t)− sii,n(t) = 0,
(c4) e∗kn (t)− γik(t)I ik,n(t)−
∑N
j=1
j≠i
γjk(t)I
∗j
k,n(t)− sik,n(t) = 0, k ≠ i.
Due to the convergence of (ein, I
i
n, s
i
n) in L
2, conditions (c1) and (c2) are verified. To prove (c3), we observe that the following
inequality chain holds:
0 ≤
ei(t)− γii(t)I ii (t)−
N−
j=1
j≠i
γji(t)I
∗j
i (t)− sii(t)

L2
≤ ei(t)− γii(t)I ii (t)− sii(t)− ein(t)− γii(t)I ii,n(t)− sii,n(t)
+
ein(t)− γii(t)I ii,n(t)− N−
j=1
j≠i
γji(t)I
∗j
i,n(t)− sii,n(t)
+
 N−
j=1
j≠i
γji(t)I
∗j
i,n(t))−
N−
j=1
j≠i
γji(t)I
∗j
i (t)


L2
→ 0.
We now verify condition (c4).
0 ≤
e∗k(t)− γik(t)I ik(t)−
N−
j=1
j≠i
γjk(t)I
∗j
k (t)− sik(t)

L2
≤

−γik(t)I ik(t)− sik(t)+ γik(t)I ik,n(t)+ sik,n(t)+
−γik(t)I ik,n(t)− sik,n(t)+ e∗kn (t)− N−
j=1
j≠i
γjk(t)I
∗j
k,n(t)

×
−e∗kn (t)+ N−
j=1
j≠i
γjk(t)I
∗j
k,n(t)+ e∗k(t)−
N−
j=1
j≠i
γjk(t)I
∗j
k (t)


L2
→ 0.
Therefore, the feasibility of (ei, I i, si) is proved. In addition, it is easy to show that Ki(e∗−i, I∗−i) is a convex set. As a
consequence, Ki(e∗−i, I∗−i) being convex and strongly closed, it is also weakly closed.
In order to prove that Ki(e∗−i, I∗−i) is a lower semi-continuous set-valued map with respect to the weak topology, we
show that, for all {(e∗in , I∗in , s∗in )} weakly convergent to (e∗i, I∗i, s∗i), briefly {(e∗in , I∗in , s∗in )} ⇀ (e∗i, I∗i, s∗i), and ∀(ei, I i, si) ∈
Ki(e∗−i, I∗−i), there exists {(ein, I in, sin)} such that
{(ein, I in, sin)}⇀ (ei, I i, si), with (ein, I in, sin) ∈ Ki(e∗−in , I∗−in ), ∀n ∈ N.
Let us consider an arbitrary sequence {(e∗in , I∗in , s∗in )} ⇀ (e∗i, I∗i, s∗i), (ei, I i, si) ∈ Ki(e∗−i, I∗−i) and t ∈ [0, t]. We
introduce the following sets:
Bi =
j ∈ {1, . . . ,N} :
N−
j=1
j≠i
γji(t)I
∗j
i (t)−
N−
j=1
j≠i
γji(t)I
∗j
i,n(t) ≤ 0
 ,
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Ci =
j ∈ {1, . . . ,N} : 0 <
N−
j=1
j≠i
γji(t)I
∗j
i (t)−
N−
j=1
j≠i
γji(t)I
∗j
i,n(t) < I
i
j (t)
 ,
Di =
j ∈ {1, . . . ,N} : I ij (t) ≤
N−
j=1
j≠i
γji(t)I
∗j
i (t)−
N−
j=1
j≠i
γji(t)I
∗j
i,n(t)
 .
Let us also construct the sequence {(ein, I in, sin)}, where I in(t) = (I i1,n(t), . . . , I iN,n(t))T and si(t) = (si1(t), . . . , siN(t))T , such
that ein(t) = ei(t), sij,n(t) = sij(t), j = 1, . . . ,N ,
I ij,n(t) =

I ij (t) if j ∈ Bi ∪ Di
I ij (t)+
N∑
j=1
j≠i
γji(t)I
∗j
i (t)−
N∑
j=1
j≠i
γji(t)I
∗j
i,n(t)
γij(t)
if j ∈ Ci,
I ik,n(t) =

I ik(t) if k ∈ Bi ∪ Di
I ik(t)+
N∑
j=1
j≠i
γjk(t)I
∗j
k (t)−
N∑
j=1
j≠i
γjk(t)I
∗j
k,n(t)
γik(t)
if k ∈ Ci.
In particular, we set
I ii,n(t) =

I ii (t) if i ∈ Bi ∪ Di
I ii (t)+
N∑
j=1
j≠i
γji(t)I
∗j
i (t)−
N∑
j=1
j≠i
γji(t)I
∗j
i,n(t)
γii(t)
if i ∈ Ci.
If j ∈ Bi∪Di, then ein(t) = ei(t), sij,n(t) = sij(t) and I ij,n(t) = I ij (t), j = 1, . . . ,N . Moreover, since (ei, I i, si) ∈ Ki(e∗−i, I∗−i),
the sequence satisfies conditions (c1)–(c4).
If j ∈ Ci, we prove that conditions (c1)–(c4) are verified.
Condition (c1)
ein(t) = ei(t) ≥ 0, sij,n(t) = sij(t) ≥ 0, I ij,n(t) = I ij (t) ≥ 0, ∀j = 1, . . . ,N.
Condition (c2)
ein(t)− γii(t)I ii,n(t)−
N−
j=1
j≠i
γij(t)I ij,n(t)
= ei(t)− γii(t)I ii (t)−
γii
γii
 N−
j=1
j≠i
γji(t)I
∗j
i (t)−
N−
j=1
j≠i
γji(t)I
∗j
i,n(t)

−
N−
j=1
j≠i
γij(t)I ij (t)−
N−
j=1
j≠i
γij(t)

N∑
j=1
j≠i
γji(t)I
∗j
i (t)−
N∑
j=1
j≠i
γji(t)I
∗j
i,n(t)
γij(t)

= ei(t)− γii(t)I ii (t)−
N−
j=1
j≠i
γij(t)I ij (t)
  
≤Ei(t)
−
N−
j=1
j≠i
γji(t)I
∗j
i (t)+
N−
j=1
j≠i
γji(t)I
∗j
i,n(t)
  
≤0
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−

N−
j=1
j≠i
γji(t)I
∗j
i (t)−
N−
j=1
j≠i
γji(t)I
∗j
i,n(t)
  
>0

≤ Ei(t).
Condition (c3)
ein(t)− γii(t)I ii,n(t)−
N−
j=1
j≠i
γji(t)I
∗j
i,n(t)− sii,n(t) = ei(t)− γii(t)I ii (t)
− γii
γii
 N−
j=1
j≠i
γji(t)I
∗j
i (t)−
N−
j=1
j≠i
γji(t)I
∗j
i,n(t)

−
N−
j=1
j≠i
γji(t)I
∗j
i,n(t)− sii(t)
= ei(t)− γii(t)I ii (t)−
N−
j=1
j≠i
γji(t)I
∗j
i (t)− sii(t) = 0.
Condition (c4)
e∗kn (t)− γik(t)I ik,n(t)−
N−
j=1
j≠i
γjk(t)I
∗j
k,n(t)− sik,n(t) = e∗k(t)−
N−
j=1
j≠i
γjk(t)I
∗j
k,n(t)− γik(t)I ik(t)
− γik(t)
N∑
j=1
j≠i
γjk(t)I
∗j
k (t)−
N∑
j=1
j≠i
γjk(t)I
∗j
k,n(t)
γik(t)
− sik(t)
= e∗k(t)− γik(t)I ik(t)−
N−
j=1
j≠i
γjk(t)I
∗j
k (t)− sik(t) = 0. 
In order to prove that {(ein, I in, sin)}weakly converges to (ei, I i, si), we show that
∀f (t) ∈ L2([0, t]), lim
n→∞
∫ t
0
f (t)

(ein, I
i
n, s
i
n)− (ei, I i, si)

dt = 0.
Due to the construction of the sequence, it is sufficient to prove the above relationship for I in(t). We have
∫ t
0
f (t)(I in(t)− I i(t))dt
 =

∫ t
0
f (t)
 −
j∈Bi∪Di
(I ii,n(t)− I ii (t))+
−
j∈Ci
(I ij,n(t)− I ij (t))

dt

=

∫ t
0
f (t)
−
j∈Ci
N∑
j=1
j≠i
γji(t)I
∗j
i (t)−
N∑
j=1
j≠i
γji(t)I
∗j
i,n(t)
γij(t)
dt

→ 0.
Thus the last expression of the above equality chain converges to zero, and we obtain that {(ein, I in, sin)} weakly converges
to (ei, I i, si). Moreover, as E is convex, closed, and bounded, it is weakly compact, and hence Ki(e∗−i, I∗−i) is also weakly
compact for all (e∗i, I∗i). Finally, assumption (b) and the strong continuity of Fi imply that Fi is weakly continuous. Thus, by
Theorem 2, the existence of at least one solution is ensured.
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